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Abstract: The pursuit of self-interest can lead to market failure when there is 
a lack of trust. Where Hume and Nietzsche located the origin of trust in the 
capacity to make promises - debts conceived in terms of values – this article 
explores the origins of modern distrust and its concomitant pursuit of self-
interest. Examining the market economies of the 16th and 17th centuries in 
England, one finds these were characterised by a shortage of coins so had to 
rely effectively on trust. Wealth consisted largely of ‘credit’ or trustworthiness, 
for this was the basis for access to goods and services with a promise of later 
payment. As such, wealth was not a possession but a reputation, and the pursuit 
of reputation took precedence over the pursuit of possessions. Since default 
on a debt could easily spread by contagion, the basis for collective welfare 
was personal morality. The key question, then, is how this conception of credit 
came to be replaced by one equivalent to debt, given a precise value and 
time for repayment. It will be argued that in this context the best way to prove 
one’s creditworthiness was to pay on time with the debt issued by a sound 
institution such as the Bank of England or the Exchequer. The financial revolution 
in England had the effect of turning the pursuit of ‘credit’ into the pursuit of 
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wealth, where debts assumed the money functions of means of payment, unit of 
account, and store of value. The result was a transformation of morality: pursuit 
of self-interest, in the form of an ability to pay in money, became the basis for 
personal morality, while money became the measure of value.
Key Words: Value, debt, credit, money, trust, Friedrich Nietzsche, William Petty, 
financial revolution.
In discussing the obligation to keep promises, David Hume wrote of a dilemma 
encountered by two farmers. It is a dilemma that shows how the pursuit of self-
interest can lead to market failure, and so is emblematic of our contemporary 
economic dilemmas:
  Your corn is ripe today; mine will be tomorrow. ‘Tis profitable for   
  us both that I shou’d labour with you today, and that you shou’d   
  aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know that you   
  have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains    
  on your account; and should I labour with you on my account,   
  I know I shou’d be disappointed, and that I shou’d in vain depend   
  upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone; You treat  
  me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose   
  our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security.1 
One can only imagine the sorry history that had led to such estrangement 
between two neighbours. Caught in the prisoner’s dilemma of game theory, 
each can do little to save their own harvest.2 There is nothing elementary in such 
a vignette of social life: our task will be to explain how such self-destructive 
pursuit of self-interest is possible. The farmers do not seem to lack conceptions 
of debt, in the form of gratitude, nor conceptions of value, in the form of profit. 
Yet, purely by its absence, the story discloses a vital condition for cooperation: 
trust. For instead of proposing that people cooperate purely on the basis of 
reciprocal exchange, as in market transactions where one good or service is 
evaluated against another – the entire basis for economics from Smith and 
Ricardo onwards – this scenario introduces a time-delay between one harvest 
and the next. The temporal interval can only be bridged by trust – or money, 
which is simply to displace the problem from trust in each other to trust in 
money.3 All economic relations take place over time, and therefore involve 
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an element of trust; it is trust that is omitted from modern economic theory. 
Where Hume enquired as to how distrust might be replaced with trust, and so 
invoked the power of promises so that commerce might supplement the ‘more 
generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices’, our problem 
is the converse: how might trust be replaced by distrust? For this, we need to 
understand how debt and value were conceived in early modern life.
 This will be a brief but circuitous and complex narrative. Friedrich 
Nietzsche will be invoked as the first to place debt and time as logically prior to 
value in economic life; yet Nietzsche’s analysis of debt solely in relation to power 
is more reminiscent of Hume’s farmers than of early modern forms of economic 
life. By contrast, credit as a productive, sociable yet dangerous principle will 
be explained through the norms of early modern tradesmen’s transactions, 
expressed as a set of moral norms by Daniel Defoe. Finally, we shall turn to 
the emergence of value as a rule of measure, elaborated by Sir William Petty, 
but first made morally effective in the financial revolution when the measure 
for value was formulated as debt. The outcome was a transformation from a 
concern for credit to a concern for self-interest – as later to be moralised, in 
somewhat different ways, by Adam Smith and Nietzsche. The conclusion of such 
a genealogy is that debt, value and trust remain moral concerns, irreducible to 
any economic ‘science’.
1. Trust, debt and power: Nietzsche’s genealogy 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche drew attention to consciousness of the past and future 
as that which distinguishes the human from the animal. At the opening of his 
second essay On the Genealogy of Morality he proposed:
  To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not   
  precisely the paradoxical task which nature has set herself    
  with regard to humankind? Is it not the real problem of humankind?4
 
Humanity is the remembering and promising animal, related to its own past 
and future: ‘it is an active desire not to let go, a desire to keep on desiring what 
has been, on some occasion, it is the will’s memory’.5 How is such a memory 
achieved, given the opposing tendency to forget – not simply a passive 
forgetting, such as that of an animal who lives in the present, but an active 
forgetting as the precondition for any concentration, any reasoning or attention? 
Nietzsche’s answer is notorious: ‘A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the 
memory: only something which continues to hurt stays in the memory.’6 He 
even attributed the origins of asceticism and religion to the solemn and cruel 
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attempts to fashion a memory for humanity.
 The context for this emergence of promises, memory and pain is treated 
by Nietzsche as an economic one: the contractual relationship between creditor 
and debtor.
 Precisely here, promises are made; precisely here, the person making  
 the promise has to have a memory made for him; precisely here, we 
can guess, is a repository of hard, cruel painful things. The debtor, 
in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be 
honoured, in order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity 
of his promise, and in order to etch the duty and obligation of 
repayment into his conscience, pawns something to the creditor by 
means of the contract in case he does not pay, something which he 
still ‘possesses’ and controls, for example, his body, or his wife, or his 
freedom, or his life...7
What we have, here, is a description of unequal exchange, a promise of life 
in return for a loan. If only Hume’s farmer had demanded such a guarantee, 
perhaps his difficulties would have been solved; but perhaps Hume’s selfish 
farmer, who only imagines the impossibility of an equal exchange, would have 
found such unequal terms quite barbaric.8 No doubt such expedients have often 
been necessary, but one cannot help but suppose that more often it has been 
the creditor, not the debtor, who has demanded such terms, whether as a prior 
condition for a loan or whether to extort payment of tribute by postponing the 
threat of death. Such formal contracts between creditor and debtor occur more 
commonly under conditions of unequal resources or unequal power, and in the 
absence of trust. The basis for trust, on this account, would be the exercise of 
naked power.
 Of course, the threat of force offers little real basis for the victor to trust 
the vanquished. It is here that Nietzsche invokes the phenomenon of guilt, the 
bad conscience through which the powerless one directs aggression against 
herself: only the person with a ‘bad conscience’ is reliable.
I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced 
to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of all changes 
which he experienced, – that change whereby he finally found 
himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace. It must 
have been no different for this semi-animal, happily adapted to the 
wilderness, war, the wandering life and adventure than it was for the 
sea animals when they were forced to either become land animals 
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or perish – at one go, all instincts were devalued and ‘suspended’ . 
. . those regulating impulses that unconsciously led them to safety 
– the poor things were reduced to relying on thinking, inference, 
calculation, and the connecting of cause with effect, that is, to 
relying on their ‘consciousness’, that most impoverished and error-
prone organ! ... All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn 
inwards – this is what I term the internalization of man: with it there 
now evolves in man what will later be called his ‘soul’. The whole 
inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers 
of skin, was expanded and extended itself and gained breadth, depth 
and height in proportion to the degree that the external discharge 
of man’s instincts were obstructed. ... Animosity, cruelty, the pleasure 
of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying – all this was pitted 
against the person who had such instincts: that is the origin of ‘bad 
conscience’9
It is most improbable that there was any such evolutionary transformation. 
Humanity, as a social animal surrounded by parents, partners, peers and progeny, 
evolved from other social animals. Trust and suspicion, fight and flight, care and 
self-limitation have been with humanity from the outset. Yet what is of interest 
in Nietzsche’s account, here, is the way it exposes the fact that environmental, 
technological and social changes devalue existing habits and impulses; change 
requires the weak powers of calculation, consciousness, decision and freedom. 
Reason only develops in response to crisis; thinking is scarce. So it is those in 
crisis, the vanquished, who first become capable of calculation and cunning. 
The problem with attempting to rule by brute force is that such force can often 
be manipulated for extrinsic ends. Blind force is incapable of ruling insofar as 
it has no ends, no relation to the past or expectation for the future. Similarly, 
a consciousness which only knows its past and future as a will, a promise or 
decision, has no knowledge of changing circumstances and external necessities.
 The fundamental problem of humanity as a social animal, then, adapting 
to the circumstances offered by changeable others, is less a matter of making 
promises than that of discerning how changeable people can nevertheless 
be trusted. Trust, the basis for all cooperation, is the fundamental human and 
economic problem. For it is hardly the case that ‘the oldest and most primitive 
personal relationship there is’ is that between buyer and seller, or creditor and 
debtor, as Nietzsche claims.10 Marx is more realistic in treating the relationship 
between man and woman as the more primitive, as the condition for human 
reproduction.11 Yet even men and women have parents. Relations to parents, 
partners, peers and progeny, insofar as they continue through time, are relations 
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of trust. Perhaps there is no distinctively human problem, here, for humans, like 
many other species, have been bred for both trust and suspicion. The human 
problem is less a matter of forming bonds of trust that endure through time than 
that of discerning where such trust is appropriate.
 The advantage of Nietzsche’s formulation of the primitive personal 
relationship as that between creditor and debtor is that it stages the encounter 
in conditions of radical uncertainty, balanced between trust and suspicion. 
This situation differs from that between buyer and seller in several significant 
respects: as we have noted, the relation between creditor and debtor is one 
that will have to endure through time; but in addition, it is formulated as a social 
relation between persons rather than as a direct and mutual comparison of 
things. Furthermore, the context for the emergence of debt is not simply the 
comparison of preferences but an expression of need. While the strength of an 
individual might be measured by the superfluity of their resources in proportion 
to their preferences, the weakness of an individual is measured by the urgency 
of their need as contrasted with the risks they would be willing to undergo in 
order to meet it – only one in extreme circumstances hazards their own body, 
wife, freedom, or life. Nietzsche is realistic in relating economic life, and even 
differences of power, to degrees of compulsion. In such encounters between 
strangers, there is a mutual sizing up of each other: ‘here person met person 
for the first time, and measured himself person against person.’12 If a trade is 
to be negotiated, then it will be one which assesses relative need and relative 
sufficiency.
Fixing prices, setting values, working out equivalents, exchanging 
– this preoccupied man’s first thoughts to such a degree that in 
a certain sense it constitutes thought: the most primitive kind of 
cunning was bred here, as was also, presumably, the first appearance 
of human pride, man’s sense of superiority over other animals. 
Perhaps our word ‘man’ (manas) expresses something of this first 
sensation of self-confidence: man designated himself as the being 
who measures values, who values and measures, as the ‘calculating 
animal as such’.13
What Nietzsche’s account exposes is the employment of such calculation 
in the service of cruelty, in taking advantage of another’s need. For in the 
context of trust, there is no need to calculate. Moreover, when compensation 
consists in an entitlement to cruelty, there is no direct equivalence between 
the wrong committed and the pleasure received – these matters are entirely 
incommensurable.14 The calculation of equivalents as a form of justice is for the 
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purpose of setting limits to revenge.15 In this respect, the one who legislates, who 
imposes a law of justice upon others, is first of all one who imposes this law of 
justice upon themselves. Legislators, who are also bound by their promises, are 
like the debtors, who are bound by theirs. They calculate:
But what a lot of preconditions there are for this! In order to have 
that degree of control over the future, man must first have learnt to 
distinguish between what happens by accident and what by design, 
to think causally, to view the future as the present and anticipate it, 
to grasp with certainty what is end and what is means, in all, to be 
able to calculate, compute – and before he can do this, man himself 
will really have to become reliable, regular, automatic, even in his 
own self-image, so that he, as someone making a promise is, is 
answerable for his own future!16 
In other words, the one who makes promises is committed to behaving 
according to necessity, as if she were imitating inanimate matter. While a 
promise may involve calculation prior to it being issued, a promise is in a certain 
respect a promise not to think. One who promises their own body, wife, freedom 
or life, who evaluates their urgent need as more significant, is also promising 
not to re-evaluate their decision: such promising involves an active forgetting, 
a refusal to attend to the value of body, wife, freedom or life. Such fidelity is 
inhuman.
 The contraction of a debt, under conditions of unequal resources, unequal 
need, and unequal power, is the moment at which the vital relationship of trust 
is replaced by a simulacrum, the debt contract, under conditions of distrust. 
Distrust, then, is the condition for the exercise of power. Now Nietzsche has this 
relationship between distrust and power inverted, basing trust on power, for his 
entire account is based on his theory of the will to power.
 A sort of pleasure is given to the creditor as repayment and 
compensation, - the pleasure of having the right to exercise power 
over the powerless without a thought, the pleasure ‘de faire le mal 
pour le plaisir de le faire’ [‘to do evil for the pleasure of doing it’], 
the enjoyment of violating: an enjoyment which is prized all the 
higher, the lower and baser the position of the creditor in the social 
scale, and which can easily seem a delicious titbit to him, even a 
foretaste of a higher rank. Through punishment of the debtor, the 
creditor takes part in the rights of the masters: at last he, too, shares 
in the elevated feeling of despising and maltreating someone as an 
313
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
‘inferior’.17
What is at stake in this morality of the school playground is purely a matter 
of prestige. As Nietzsche indicates, the pleasure of cruelty is desired primarily 
by those who have masters themselves who have been cruel. Only a damaged 
person takes pleasure in such an exercise of power. What is distinctive about 
Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power, however, is that he extends it from the 
purely human relations where it belongs to the entire field of nature: 
Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the 
strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one’s own 
forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation. 
. . . ‘Exploitation’ does not pertain to a corrupt or imperfect or 
primitive society: it pertains to the essence of the living thing as a 
fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will 
to power which is precisely the will of life.18
So on the one hand, for Nietzsche, the one who promises has to behave as if 
their will were a piece of fate, a natural necessity. On the other hand, however, 
nature is no longer considered in terms of necessity, but in terms of the active 
freedom to exploit pleasure from cruelty. There is no doubt some degree of 
confusion between freedom and necessity here, but it is one born of a significant 
insight. For freedom can only be articulated in terms of necessity; yet necessity 
is a compulsion that is present; freedom consists in proportioning anticipation to 
recollection.
 Simone Weil can assist us in sorting out the confusion. In her account 
of the social struggle for power, concerned with privilege, obedience and 
oppression, Weil wrote of the necessity that belongs to the exercise of force as 
such:
The preservation of power is a vital necessity for the powerful, since 
it is their power which provides their sustenance; but they have 
to preserve it both against their rivals and against their inferiors, 
and these latter cannot do otherwise than try to rid themselves of 
dangerous masters; for, through a vicious circle, the master produces 
fear in the slave by the very fact that he is afraid of him, and vice 
versa; and the same is true between rival powers.19
The masters too have needs, have conditions of existence, and these are the 
source of their strength as well as their downfall. Yet this is a distinctively 
314
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
On the Origins of Modern Debt and Value: Revisiting Friedrich Nietzsche and William Petty
social relation: in the relation between humanity and nature, there is no fear, no 
threat nor promise. For the relation between humanity and nature is an entirely 
present one; it is not extended by recollection or anticipation on the part of 
nature. Of course, humans feel the pressure of natural necessity, and meet 
with resistance and obstacles in their endeavours to fulfil their needs. Yet this 
struggle is entirely asymmetrical: the natural world does not defend itself against 
human intervention. It neither anticipates nor fears.20 Like a perfect Stoic, nature 
manifests an acceptance of necessity, and so does not collude with any power 
based on the threat of force. As a result, the struggle is set within real limits, for 
once an effort is successful and a need fulfilled, the struggle is over. This is not 
the case with the social struggle for power, for to exterminate one’s slaves would 
be to exterminate the source of one’s power, and to exterminate one’s rivals 
would be to exterminate one’s prestige. Social power is essentially unstable:
For, owing to the fact that there is never power, but only a race for 
power, and that there is no term, no limit, no proportion set to this 
race, neither is there any limit or proportion set to the efforts that it 
exacts; those who give themselves up to it, compelled to do always 
better than their rivals, who in their turn strive to do better than they, 
must sacrifice not only the existence of the slaves, but their own also 
and that of their nearest and dearest...21
Here we meet the self-destructive behaviour of Hume’s farmers. The struggle 
for prestige, unlike the struggle against nature, is an unlimited quest. Even if 
the masters dream of moderation, they can only practise it at the risk of being 
overcome by others. Under the conditions of such an unlimited struggle, only the 
strongest survive.
 Now, according to Weil’s account of the natural order, all beings are limited 
by their conditions of existence.22 Far from power being a matter of will, it is a 
matter of resources, and those who exhaust their resources will lose their power. 
Since everything exists only in dependence on its material conditions, everything 
exists within given proportions and limits. In this respect, to regard the natural 
order as a matter of preference or will is simply to extrapolate the conditions 
of the social struggle for power into the natural order. It is to treat the natural 
order as though it made calculations, recollecting the past and anticipating 
the future. It is to treat it as though it senses fear, threat and promise. Yet even 
the social order is a part of natural necessity, and operates within its own limits 
and conditions: a power that overreaches itself will destroy itself. So the social 
struggle for prestige is itself constituted by illusion, since it seeks recognition by 
others rather than knowledge of its own limits and conditions of existence.
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 In placing such an emphasis on the will to power, Nietzsche implicitly 
appeals to prestige. In this he is not alone, as Weil indicates in her critique of all 
existing moral values:
We all choose for treasure those values that have their substance 
in social prestige. This is true even for the desires which seem 
only to have reference to individuals. So is the desire of the lover. 
‘Love without vanity is only an invalid,’ said La Rochefoucauld. The 
pleasures of eating and drinking are much more social than they 
seem at first. Riches, power, advancement, decorations, honours 
of every kind, reputation, recognition, are values of an exclusively 
social order. Under the names of beauty and truth almost all artists 
and scholars seek social prestige. The etiquette of charity, of love for 
one’s neighbour, is generally a cover for the same article.
 Social prestige, as the name itself indicates, is pure illusion, 
a thing which has no existence.23
Weil’s conclusion is in accordance with that of Adam Smith:
For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? What is 
the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, 
and pre-eminence? Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The 
wages of the meanest labourer can supply them... From whence, 
then, arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks 
of men, and what are the advantages which we propose by that 
great purpose of life which we call bettering our condition? To be 
observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, 
complacency and approbation, are all the advantages which we 
can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the 
pleasure, which interests us.24 
Yet if such prestige is vacuous, we reach Nietzsche’s fundamental philosophical 
question: what is the substance of value? From what does the value of values 
derive? Where Nietzsche offers the will to power, it is all too easy to see a 
yearning for prestige. The quest for prestige is a social necessity, for insofar as 
we are dependent for survival on cooperation with others, that cooperation is 
largely only forthcoming in response to the offer of reified prestige, or money. 
How does money transform trust? To address this, we shall seek out some of the 
historical forebears of Hume’s farmers among English tradesmen, merchants and 
landowners of the seventeenth century.
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2. Credit and faith: Defoe and morality as microeconomics
Walter Powell of Gloucestershire, in a pamphlet of 1645 campaigning against the 
swearing of oaths entitled A summons for swearers, and a law for the lips, wrote:
If wee walk unblameable in our lives; if we so highly value truth, that 
we sell it at no rate; if we keep touch, and observe promises, though 
to our hinderance; our word, even in our weightiest businesse, will 
be credited, and need no superior confirmation: for it is not the oath 
which give credit to the man, but the man to the oath. . . . speak 
the truth without an oath, and . . . thy word shall be taken by itself; 
otherwise thou art like an ill credited borrower, that ridest up and 
down the country with sureties.25
Powell was clearly concerned that an oath, a declaration of one’s sincerity before 
God, was a poor substitute for character, putting duty before inclination. It is 
not the principle behind the oath that offended Powell – that there is a God 
who is offended by lies but approves of faith and truth – so much as explicitly 
drawing attention to this principle that was accepted by all at the time. If there 
is such a God, then one is judged on one’s word, not simply on one’s formal 
oaths; the invocation of God therefore reveals a practical atheism in the rest 
of one’s doings, and discloses an untrustworthy character. Powell’s campaign 
was aimed at the religious improvement of ‘poorer sort’ of people, ‘oaths being 
the common sureties of the basest of people, even the scum of highways, 
Alehouses and Taverns’, those associated with vagrancy, debt, idleness, 
indulgence and dissipation. Yet what is presupposed in such a campaign is that 
piety is associated with probity, and honouring promises is not simply a matter 
of personal morality, but the very basis for the common wealth of the people 
as a whole – if there are some whose word cannot be trusted, then one ought 
to be miserly with trust, and everyone is poorer. What seems so foreign to the 
economic culture of England in the twenty-first century seemed entirely natural 
in the seventeenth: that religious faith should underpin the economic order.
 Craig Muldrew offers an explanation in his account of the credit economy 
in early modern England from 1530-1720. The context, here, was one of rising 
prosperity: the Tudor policy of encouraging wool manufacture, replacing arable 
lands with sheep, setting households to work in spinning and weaving, selling 
the manufactured cloth abroad, while forbidding the export of raw wool, seemed 
to be paying off.26 Such a concentration led to increasing returns, a division of 
labour, greater synergies within towns, new knowledge, and the emergence of 
a free internal market concentrated on market towns. Since farming sheep was 
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less labour intensive than farming crops, many were displaced from working 
the land directly, but at least some of these found employment in growing 
craft production within towns. With a rise in population, and households 
increasingly engaging in market activities, there was an acute shortage of 
coinage throughout the period. For out of the coins in circulation, many were 
centuries old, most were clipped, and the good ones were consequently hoarded 
by merchants for important transactions. Moreover, coins had to be accumulated 
for rents, tithes and taxes, for use in emergencies, for lending to those with 
pressing obligations or whose reputations were in decline, for landowners to pay 
large bills, and for merchants to engage in overseas exchange, and so they did 
not circulate frequently. Credit expanded rapidly to take the place of money in 
daily transactions in the form of deferred payment for goods and services. Debts 
were often not of borrowed coins at all; they were incomplete transactions. 
Payment dates were also subject to continual renegotiation, balancing the needs 
of creditors against debtors. Wherever possible, reciprocal debts contracted 
between various interested parties over a number of months could then be 
‘reckoned’ or cancelled against each other, with only the remaining balance 
paid in coins. In this way, credit accelerated the velocity of money:27 Muldrew 
estimates that in the East Anglian port town of King’s Lynn in the 1680s every 
pound, as an abstract unit of account, would have changed hands once every 
ten days, while the majority of coins would have been retained by the rich 
merchants.28
 Many writers of the early modern period attested to the fact that private 
credit, rather than coinage, was the main basis for the transfer of goods and 
services. The result, as both diaries and legal records show, is that all, whether 
rich or poor, had a multitude of debts owing to them, as well as owing debts to 
others. Early in the eighteenth century, Daniel Defoe in The Complete Tradesman 
argued for the impossibility of carrying on trade successfully without giving 
credit:
He that gives no trust, and takes no trust, either by wholesale or by 
retail, and keeps his cash all himself... so no body is in debt to him, 
and all his estate is in his shop; but I suppose the Tradesman that 
trades wholly thus, is not yet born, or if there ever were any such, 
they are all dead.29 
Hume’s farmers do not belong here. The phrasing is revealing: an estate is 
not ‘in his shop’, an inventory or a collection of coins, a private property in his 
own possession, but with other people in their obligations towards him. Even 
land was not ultimately a protection against debt, for it could be sold off to 
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keep debtors out of prison. The only significant form of wealth was ‘credit’ 
understood as a reputation – one for honest dealing, for care in repaying debts, 
and for ‘sociability’ or being obliging to others in their needs. Muldrew explains:
Wealth in this period is thus better thought of as a series of personal 
relationships with neighbours and God in which virtue, providence 
and fortune were all socially understood to be factors contributing 
to the condition and estimation of wealth by others.30 
Wealth was not a possession but an attitude. Defoe made this difference 
between wealth as cash and wealth as credit explicit:
Of what fatal consequence then is the raising of rumours and 
suspicions upon the credit and characters of young tradesmen? and 
how little do those who are forward to raise such suspicions, and 
spread such rumours, consult conscience, or principle, or honour, in 
what they do? how little do they consider that they are committing a 
trading murther, and that, with respect to the justice of it, they may 
with much more equity break open the tradesman’s house, and rob 
his cash-chest, or his shop? and what they can carry away thence 
will not do him half the injury that robbing his character of what is 
due to it from an upright and diligent conduct, would do: the loss 
of his money or goods is easily made up, and may be sometimes 
repaired with advantage; but the loss of credit is never repair’d; the 
one is breaking upon his house, but the other is burning it down; the 
one carries away some goods, but the other shuts goods out from 
coming in; one is hurting the tradesman, but the other is undoing.31 
The difference from what was to follow is extraordinary. To be wealthy was 
less a matter of having access to money than it was a matter of having access 
to credit. One’s wealth simply was one’s social standing; but, conversely, one’s 
social standing was one’s source of wealth. As such, it was insecure: in every 
sale on credit, in every act of standing surety for an associate or relative, one 
was exposed to the fortunes of others. An ability to pay one’s own debts was 
only partially dependent on oneself; it was also dependent on the actions of 
others. In each transaction, then, it was important to estimate the credit of the 
counterparty. If one did not sell upon credit, one would have no customers; if 
one did, one was exposed to the customers’ fortunes and degree of honesty. 
In this respect, wealth was interdependent. It mattered far less what one had in 
one’s shop, or that one enjoyed the benefits of luxury, than that one enjoyed the 
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benefits of reputation, and could call on others whenever need arose.
 The dynamics of this economy of obligation were very different to the 
dynamics of free market competition based upon self-interest, even though 
this was largely a free market where the state had very little role. For there 
was no complete estrangement of economic from social life: wealth consisted 
in social relations, or specifically, in one’s credit as estimated by others, and in 
one’s debtors’ ability and willingness to pay. If rumours went around that one 
was unwilling to pay debts, dishonest in transactions, spending beyond one’s 
means, or too idle to provide for oneself, then one’s ability to trade could quickly 
evaporate – few would advance goods. As a corollary, if one was slow in paying 
one’s debts, then rumours about one’s character might start to circulate. This 
economy of obligation was extremely insecure. Credit as reputation was far 
more valuable than cash in hand: the diarists of this period, such as Samuel 
Pepys, were not kept awake at night by the fear that some of their debtors might 
never pay, for they expected to have to write off a portion of what was owing 
to them due to the misfortune or poverty of their debtors. What kept them 
awake was their own debts, for a reputation for paying honestly was the basis 
for their credit. Account books were very poorly kept, but debts, sworn in front 
of witnesses, were seared into memory. There was little need for the extraction 
of a pledge to guarantee payment, for every purchase on credit involved staking 
one’s entire reputation.32 People cared more for their social standing than they 
did for their profits, for their creditworthiness was the basis for their survival. As 
Defoe explained:
CREDIT is so much a tradesman’s blessing, that ‘tis the choicest ware 
he deals in, and he cannot be too chary of it when he has it, or buy it 
too dear when he wants it; ‘tis a stock to his warehouse, ‘tis current 
money in his cash-chest, it accepts all his bills; for ‘tis on the fund of 
his credit that he has any bills to accept... in a word ‘tis the life and 
soul of his trade, and it requires his utmost vigilance to preserve it.33 
 These are heartfelt words: Defoe had gone bankrupt and was writing to earn to 
repay his debts.
 Yet this is only part of the story: it regards credit from an individual 
(microeconomic) point of view. A person’s trustworthiness was the 
(macroeconomic) concern of whole towns and villages because of the 
extensiveness of credit and the potential domino effect of default. The more 
reliable people were in paying debts, or delivering goods and services as 
promised, the more secure the chains of credit, and the greater the chance of 
material security for the whole community.34 An interest in the moral conduct 
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of others was a concern for all: this is why there were campaigns to improve 
morals. The word ‘interest’ itself was not used in the sense of self-interest, but in 
the sense of mutual advantage. Honest trade was sociability and cooperation. It 
was conducted through extensive conversation and negotiation.
 The growth of credit, even if an expression of a growth of cooperation, 
also led to a growth in risk and instability. Misfortunes such as a poor harvest, 
fire, or death, whether they struck one’s family, one’s debtors, or simply one’s 
customers, could have a significant effect. Instability was certainly a spur to 
competition, but competition was not simply for wealth or customers, but 
especially for credit. For among the misfortunes that could strike must be 
counted dishonest, lazy or profligate neighbours. In reaction to this, moral 
competition was far more apparent than economic competition: one had to 
cultivate a reputation for paying dues, honesty, diligence and thrift. In addition 
to this, the main economic effect was competitive piety – religious belief, virtue 
and honesty were regarded as the basis of moral virtue. For the basis for trust in 
promises in early modern England stemmed from the shared culture of Christian 
belief: one could trust one’s neighbours as fellow believers.35 One would trust 
above all others those who were most devout – and for the purposes of trade, 
unlike those of politics, the variety of Christian devotion itself was less significant 
than its authenticity.36 Above all, one had to use words both to persuade and to 
manifest transparently the decency of one’s character.37
 
3. Measure for measure: William Petty, value and money
An abiding fascination with the skill of the wordsmiths of the Tudor and 
Stuart eras may be due, in part, to the heavy burden words had to bear in the 
daily interactions of the time – not merely in entertainment, as in the theatre 
or intrigues at court, but in the quotidian business of negotiating credit and 
exchange. Business negotiations would last for hours, and consisted of elaborate 
speeches appealing to need, conscience, morality, religion, and mutual interest.38 
By contrast, how efficient, elegant, articulate and, above all, concise must have 
seemed those negotiations conducted by the offer of money. For where requests 
for credit could only offer vague assurances of future value, money could offer 
the substance itself. Money talks. John Briscoe – a man who imagined that the 
value of land itself could be invested into a paper sign by means of a land bank 
– was to argue in a pamphlet of 1695, A Discourse of Money, that gold and silver 
possess intrinsic value. Briscoe even attributed a lack of productivity to the 
parlous state of England’s coins, ancient, worn, clipped and highly underweight 
as they were – people would work for a fine, beautiful, and correctly minted 
new coin simply for its intrinsic value, but would not be willing to labour for the 
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worn and underweight.39 Of course, the ideas of this pamphlet were relatively 
insignificant in comparison to John Locke’s effective arguments for a thorough 
recoinage,40 but they are, at least, illustrative of attitudes at the time: a correctly 
weighted coin is the antidote to all suspicion and hypocrisy. When discussing 
the advantages of collective depositing to form a bank, Briscoe observed: 
‘For in such a case men are ingag’d by stronger Bonds than can be had from 
Conscience, Religion, Honour, or any other specious Tye; because in these we 
may be sure there may be Hypocrisie, but in Interest we know there is none.’41 
Likewise, when trust is sorely needed, how much more reliable it is to place one’s 
trust in a coin than in a character.
 Yet how radical to take this truthful speech of money in merchant’s 
negotiations and turn it into a theory of language to displace all prior 
metaphysics. This is precisely what had been done four decades earlier by 
Thomas Hobbes: ‘For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by 
them; but they are the mony of fools, that value them by the authority of an 
Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.’42 
More formally, Hobbes expressed his account of the merchants’ reasoning that 
was to replace the cleric’s metaphysics like this:
In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and 
subtraction, there also is place for Reason; and where these have no 
place, there Reason has nothing at all to do... For REASON, in this 
sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Subtracting) 
of the Consequences of the generall names agreed upon for the 
marking and signifying of our thoughts.43 
Just as in merchants’ negotiations, knowledge, for Hobbes, consisted in taking 
an agreed object of the senses, clearly defined, and finding a numerical value for 
it. There is no place here for moral philosophy or metaphysics.
 It was Thomas Hobbes’ one-time protégé, the enlightened colonialist 
Sir William Petty, who applied this reasoning to invent the science of ‘political 
arithmetic’, and who was therefore regarded by Marx as the founder of classical 
political economy. Petty was one of the founding members of the Royal Society 
in London, but was unique among them in applying empirical investigation to 
economic matters. Although gaining a chair in medicine at Oxford at the age 
of 27 as a result of the fallout of the English Civil War, he was disillusioned with 
clerical influence in the university and its suppression of the new science, so he 
took a post as the physician to Cromwell’s army in Ireland, and then volunteered 
to undertake a thorough survey of the entire land and economy of Ireland so 
that those who had funded the expedition, the so-called Irish Adventurers, could 
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be paid in equitable portions of land – some 2.5 million acres.44 Petty worked 
out his economic ideas through a painstaking survey of the conquered land and 
its livelihood. Petty was an ambitious political man, rather than a merchant, but 
sought to apply the merchant’s morality of truth-telling, diligence, and thrift to 
a whole nation through scientific calculation. The colonisation of comparatively 
undeveloped Ireland – Petty estimated that 85% of the population engaged in 
virtually no commodity exchange at all45 – provided the perfect opportunity for 
the application of political arithmetic. For Petty was convinced that Irish poverty 
was no more a result of their character or land than Dutch wealth was a result of 
theirs – it was simply a matter of organisation and opportunity to work.
 Petty sought the basis of value in natural rent and necessary labour, rather 
than in any monetary comparison or measure, for money itself can vary in value, 
whether in place, time, or in the quality of its coinage. He suggested that one 
man could produce enough grain seed to provide subsistence for nine others 
apart from himself – this was the necessary labour, and the natural rent was the 
surplus product in addition to basic subsistence. The key political question was 
how to handle this surplus. Petty recommended redistribution through taxes, 
taking the surplus from the landed and idle and rewarding craftspeople and the 
industrious. Since thrift was the only way to enrich a nation, this would naturally 
be a consumption tax. The wealth of the public is diminished if tax goes the 
other way, and is imposed on ‘the Stocks of laborious and ingenious Men’ for 
the sake of supporting ‘such as do nothing at all, but eat and drink, sing, play 
and dance; ... such as study the Metaphysicks, or other needless Speculation; or 
else employ themselves in any other way, which produce no material thing, or 
things of real use and value in the Commonwealth.’46 Specifically, Petty sought 
to reduce expenditure on defence, public offices, universities, clergy, lawyers 
and physicians, but also considered that the numbers of merchants and retailers 
in England could be significantly reduced. By contrast, the unproductive poor 
could be provided for out of the surplus, although it would be better if the able-
bodied among them could be put to work improving highways, clearing rivers, 
building bridges and planting trees. This is thrift and industriousness considered 
on a national scale.
 Of course, there are enormous over-simplifications involved in any attempt 
to put figures on such values. In particular, all labour is compared with simple, 
subsistence labour, as though skilled labour did not make any difference;47 
similarly, subsistence products are assimilated to corn. The problem of making 
comparisons of heterogeneous values has not been solved. Petty was aware 
of such simplifications, but quoted simple estimates of figures in order to 
demonstrate the underlying principles.48 Clearly, a wealthy nation was not 
necessarily one that had the highest per capita production of corn. After all, 
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food is perishable, and Petty had a hierarchical notion of kinds of wealth based 
on degree of perishability, from food, through commodities, to property, land, 
and unperishable gold and silver.49 For all his interest in the division of labour 
and technological improvements, he still lacked a conception of capital as the 
means of production that is itself produced. Yet what is striking is that Petty, 
who invented the concept of the ‘velocity of money’, did not estimate the wealth 
of the nation in terms of its possession of durable coinage any more than by 
its possession of perishable corn. The quantity of money was not a measure 
of wealth. For just like a merchant, a nation lacking in coin is not necessarily 
poor, ‘For as the most thriving men keep little or no coin by them, but turn and 
wind it into various Commodities to their great Profit, so may a Nation also.’50 
He even calculated a quantity of coin needed for circulation; if a nation had too 
much, it could easily melt some down for plate, or send it out for trade where it 
is desired, or lend it out at interest. More pressing, in his day, was the converse 
problem of too little money, and on this issue he was both optimistic and 
prophetic: ‘We must erect a Bank, which well computed, doth almost double the 
Effect of our coined Money: And we have in England Materials for a Bank which 
shall furnish Stock enough to drive the Trade of the whole Commercial World.’51 
 For all Petty’s seminal ideas concerning intrinsic value in relation to 
subsistence, labour and land, and their subsequent influence, via Cantillon and 
Quesnay, on Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, it was perhaps the financial 
revolution in England that succeeded in making his science possible by providing 
a practical measure for measure. Petty had already given one of the strongest 
arguments for a thorough recoinage back in 1682:
Qu. 1. Whether the old unequal Money ought to be new coined, and 
brought into a new Equality?
 Answ. It ought. Because Money made of Gold and Silver is the best 
Rule of Commerce, and must therefore be equal, or else it is no Rule; 
and consequently no Money, and but bare Metal which was Money 
before it was worn and abused into Inequality.52
For alongside credit and litigation, commerce requires a measure for payments, 
a unit of account. Without a consistent measure for money, there could be 
no consistent calculations of profit and loss – and the state of the coinage is 
perhaps why English merchants had so rarely made such calculations up until 
this time. While the great recoinage agreed in 1696 was a crisis measure in 
response to the rapid depreciation of English coinage in comparison to foreign 
coins whose value was judged by weight, more lasting effects were perhaps 
achieved by the issue of paper permitted in 1697 to the newly founded Bank of 
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England (1694). For a paper note, since it is merely the promise of money, has 
none of the disadvantages of wear, debasement and clipping. Moreover, paper 
notes can be printed in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of trade 
and commerce. Most of all, while a paper note issued by an individual may not 
trusted sufficiently to be transferrable, one issued by a bank or a sovereign state 
could be – with highly significant effects for lubricating investment.53 Banking, 
which converts illiquid bilateral debts into transferrable ones, could increase 
the rate of investment fourfold or more, even without direct bank loans to 
entrepreneurs – one hardly needs to seek further for the origins of capitalism. 
The decisive economic and cultural transformation which took place in the 
eighteenth-century as a result of the financial revolution is that an increasing 
proportion of trade took place as an instantaneous exchange by means of the 
transfer of paper securities, rather than by spoken credit agreements. Trust in 
paper with an institutional backing was more secure than trust in the individual 
who stood before one pleading. As a result, people proved their integrity by 
paying with money; and more transactions over greater distances could be 
conducted. Money, it would seem, offered the substance rather than the mere 
promise of value; and yet the money that was offered was still credit.
 It was in this way that both the success and the insecurity of the credit 
economy of the seventeenth century set the demand for money. The initial 
impulse of the demand for money was competitive piety: the ability to pay in 
money was useful to prove one’s credit, one’s honesty, diligence and thrift. To 
pay with cash was to outdo one’s neighbours in respectability. This was the 
‘intrinsic’ value that merchants saw in gold and silver: not simply that it was 
desirable in exchange, but that it could be used as an immediate offer of lasting 
worth. Moreover, money was desired as a public good: the greater the proportion 
of transactions effected immediately by money, the less the outstanding debts, 
and the more secure all would be from contagion by default. Such may have 
been the motivations for mercantilism, the policy of endeavouring to increase 
the stock of money in the country by subsidising exports of goods in exchange 
for money, and restricting imports.54 There was also a strong political case for 
the establishment of a bank. Yet, as if by an invisible hand, public benefits were 
transformed into private vices, for one could best contribute to this aspect of the 
common good – economic security – by means of the private pursuit of money. 
The greater the private accumulation of wealth, the more secure one was as 
an individual, and the greater the contribution one could make to the security 
of society by paying for one’s needs with money. Money, as opposed to credit, 
could even turn the principle of thrift upside down: it was through avarice and 
luxury that the wealthy could best contribute to the common good by passing 
their money on to others to spend. The satirist Bernard Mandeville’s 1705 The 
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Grumbling Hive (later re-published with a commentary as The Fable of the Bees, 
or Private Vices, Public Benefits) describes this situation with the causality 
inverted because, in his opposition to moral education of the poor, he started 
with production as the fundamental reality: for him it was greed which, through 
trade and exchange, led to hard work to produce commodities for the common 
good. He delimited the common good to the goods that can be individually 
appropriated. By contrast, those whose primary concern was for the moral state 
of the commonwealth and the security of its credit, could sanction the pursuit 
of individual wealth for the sake of contributing to economic security and 
prosperity. It was hardly surprising that such a standpoint could be suspected of 
hypocrisy.
 Most significantly, following the financial revolution and the printing of 
secure paper money, money could at last start to fulfil effectively its traditional 
role as the measure of values. For paper money merely signifies an abstract 
quantity, uniform and homogeneous. The value that it signifies is purely 
metaphysical. Of course, the value of that paper depends on trust in the bank’s 
ability to pay. When Sir Isaac Newton established the gold standard for the Bank 
of England’s note issue in 1717, the effect was not that people presented their 
bills for payment in gold, but quite the opposite: trust in the backing of paper by 
the ‘intrinsic value’ of gold was quite sufficient to lend value to paper. Of course, 
neither the paper nor the gold itself held any intrinsic value – the whole charade 
was a confidence trick. In economic life, things hold value only if sufficient 
people believe that they do; those who believe, however, can rarely acknowledge 
this without dissolving the basis for credit. Yet the basis of banking is quite 
simple, as J. K. Galbraith has explained:
The original depositor could get his money, for it was still there. So, 
alternatively, could the man to whom the deposit was lent. Both 
could not. The marvel of banks in relation to money – the wonder of 
creating deposits or issuing notes that so served – was suspended 
on one silken thread. That was the requirement that depositors or 
noteholders come in decently small numbers for the hard currency 
that the bank was under obligation to pay.55 
Credit, when institutionalised by the establishment of a bank, does not cease 
to be credit. The measure for measure remains a degree of trust or credulity. 
Debt and value are constructed on the basis of trust. Subsequent economic 
expansion, with its multitude of financial crises, never ceases to remind us of this 
fact.
 Perhaps the new morality of self-interest reached its ultimate 
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consequences in the South Sea Bubble of 1720. The South Sea Company had 
been founded in 1711 for providing a loan to the state: the company undertook 
to provide the money due to the army and navy in return for security on various 
duties and a monopoly on trading in the Pacific Ocean. But in 1720 it offered 
to take over all the debts of the State, estimated at over £30 million, in return 
for an interest rate of 5% for seven years, 4% thereafter. Such a scheme was 
extremely attractive to those who could afford to invest: the success of the initial 
subscriptions caused its share prices to rise from £126 in 1719 to £2,000 by June 
1720. In response to this, a host of fraudulent companies were set up with share 
prices that also rose rapidly. On the basis of this rapid increase of merely nominal 
wealth, there was greater spending and overall growth. As a result of the rising 
prosperity and inequality, speculation fever took hold of the entire nation, with 
perhaps £300 million subscribed in total to different projects.56 Many of those 
who shared in the fever knew perfectly well that it was all a fraud, but hoped to 
make a profit by withdrawing before the others did. Even Sir Isaac Newton was 
dragged in, against his better judgement, and lost a considerable amount. The 
bubble was finally pricked by the South Sea Company itself, when, alarmed by 
the success of these other projects, it obtained a writ from the Lord Justices 
to dissolve the bubble companies. As everything collapsed, and thousands 
of families were bankrupted, the panic spread to its own shares. A handful of 
individuals were enriched at the expense of many. The ultimate result, however, 
was a shaking to the foundations of an economy based on personal credit, thrift, 
and sociability, for most had contributed to the destruction of the public welfare 
by their own self-seeking. While each might have repented of being caught up in 
the folly, the basis for personal trust could never be as solid as before. Payment, 
in the future, would be increasingly expected in the form of money. It was the 
national debt and the Bank of England that survived. And in spite of the nominal 
convertibility of Bank of England promises for gold, it was the notes themselves 
that increasingly became the object of credit, and the measure for measures of 
value.
4. Conclusion
Let us return, therefore, to the exceptional mutual distrust of Hume’s farmers. 
Why do they pursue their perceived self-interests at the expense of their own 
livelihoods? Why do their private vices yield no public benefits? A Nietzschean 
answer would offer a straightforward moralism: in their competitive bids for 
power, they do not wish to be deceived. Yet what remains to be explained is why 
they seek power, why their pursuit of power is unlimited, even at the expense 
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of their harvests and interests. Why seek power, when trust would be so much 
more advantageous to life? One cannot help but suspect that here, too, these 
farmers remain pious, and plough and harvest a purely moral ground. They take 
their fire from the flame lit by a faith that is but three centuries old, the same 
flame as Nietzsche, that power is the truth, that power is divine. It is time to spell 
out their genealogy.
 Their forebears were Presbyterian tradesmen – real farmers, their lives 
ruled by necessity, could never have been so foolish as Hume imagines – whose 
pursuit of security in an unstable world destined them to honesty, diligence 
and thrift. For such tradesmen, in an economy based on deferred payments, 
the public good was upheld by personal morality. The pursuit of personal 
credit, as an ability to fulfil promises and complete transactions, was the basis 
for collective welfare. An appearance of personal piety was the strongest 
recommendation for personal credit, alongside prompt payment, honesty, 
diligence and thrift. Since wealth was measured more by one’s credit, by 
the estimates of others, than by one’s cash reserves, the pursuit of material 
wealth was a means towards the pursuit of social prestige in the form of 
creditworthiness. The value of values was purely spiritual: it measured character; 
it could not be directly quantified.
 The most remarkable transformation was brought about by the transfer 
of debts to a third party. For one who pays with a reliable third parties’ credit 
note is like one who pays immediately with cash: not only is their own personal 
credit enhanced, and certainly is no longer under scrutiny, but they also benefit 
the seller as well as the security of wider society because the seller can, in 
turn, transfer the debt onwards. The most respected and transferrable credit 
notes of Hume’s era were, of course, those of the principal Scottish banks – 
the Bank of Scotland, and the Royal Bank of Scotland – as well as treasury 
bills issued by the Exchequer in London – Hume’s farmers could have solved 
their problems if they had sufficient money. Insofar as such credit notes were 
underwritten by the State with its power of taxation, they came with a reliable 
guarantee. Gradually, through the eighteenth-century, bank notes came to 
function effectively as money, in contrast to commercial paper that was widely 
distrusted after the South Sea Bubble. It was this that brought about the 
remarkable transformation of personal morality. Initially, one paid with cash 
and sought after cash, both for the sake of the public welfare, and for the sake 
of one’s personal reputation: using cash gave one better credit. Yet gradually, 
economic success came to be measured in terms of cash rather than measured 
in terms of credit. It was far safer to do business with those who were wealthy 
in cash terms than those who were poor, for they would be under less pressure 
to defer payments as customers or to impose harsh terms as suppliers, and so 
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those who were cash-rich grew more so. Moreover, the cash-value of assets 
could be directly quantified, leading to comparisons of more and less, and the 
pursuit of quantifiable profits. With no upper limit on the quantity of paper 
in circulation, the quest for claims upon the State in the form of money could 
become unlimited. The unlimited quest for power, power at any price, retained 
the social approbation formerly offered only to personal credit by enhancing 
the stability and welfare of all. Moreover, insofar as wealth was seen as a result 
of productivity, then wealth measured the productivity of individuals and their 
contribution to society. Our farmers have taken this quantitative competition one 
step further: here person measured himself against person for the first time. For 
where cooperation governs the economy of obligation, competition governs the 
economy of credit money.
 Genealogies, of course, may simply be ‘just so’ stories.57 Our forebears 
do not tell us of the character or dynamics of our contemporary experience. 
Nevertheless, they may help to formulate research agendas by indicating where 
we might look beyond the surface of our contemporary world. The world of 
global finance continues to function as an economy of pure credit, where one 
only issues promises or exchanges the debts of others, and where reputation 
– especially that of central banks, sovereign states, and the principal banking 
corporations – is all. Yet the dominance of this financial world is maintained by 
a discourse of the competitive, self-maximising behaviour of individual rational 
actors, like Hume’s farmers, in flagrant disconnection with the boom and bust 
dynamics and credit crises of the interconnected financial world. In both cases, 
behaviour is regulated by preaching a kind of morality, even if such moralities 
cannot be easily reconciled. An account of how debt and value in this world 
come to be constituted via morality is the first step towards a revaluation of 
values.
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